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  Université de Montréal and CIRANO
Nous utilisons des données américaines provenant du National
Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY) pour examiner l'effet de la formation sur le
tas par rapport à la mobilité observée des jeunes travailleurs américains. Des
modèles de durée paramétriques nous permettent d'évaluer l'impact économique de
la formation sur le temps productif passé avec un employeur. Nos résultats sont
cohérents avec la plupart des études précédentes, qui trouvaient un impact positif
et significatif. Cependant, la durée de la relation de travail nette du temps passé en
formation n'augmente pas de manière significative. Nous procédons par la suite à
l'analyse de la mobilité intrasectorielle et intersectorielle afin d'inférer par rapport
à la spécificité du capital humain acquis par la formation, soit le capital humain
spécifique à la firme, soit spécifique à l'industrie, soit général. L'analyse
économétrique permet de rejeter un modèle séquentiel de choix de secteur en
faveur d'un modèle à risques concurrents. Nos résultats inclinent fortement en
faveur de la spécificité de la formation à l'industrie. La probabilité d'un changement
de secteur d'activité suite à une séparation d'un emploi décroît avec la formation
reçue dans l'industrie présente, peu importe si celle-ci a été reçue du dernier
employeur ou d'un employeur précédent. La probabilité de detenir un emploi suite
à une séparation augmente avec la formation sur le tas. Ces résultats résistent à des
variations du modèle de base.
Using data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY), we
re-examine the effect of formal on-the-job training on mobility patterns of young
American workers. By employing parametric duration models, we evaluate the
economic impact of training on productive time with an employer. Confirming
previous studies, we find a positive and statistically significant impact of formal
on-the-job training on tenure with the employer providing the training. However,
expected duration net of the time spent in the training program is generally not
significantly increased. We proceed to document and analyze intra-sectoral and
cross-sectoral mobility patterns in order to infer whether training provides firm-
specific, industry-specific, or general human capital. The econometric analysis
rejects a sequential model of job separation in favor of a competing risks
specification. We find significant evidence for the industry-specificity of training.
The probability of sectoral mobility upon job separation decreases with training
received in the current industry, whether with the last employer or previous
employers, and employment attachment increases with on-the-job training. These
results are robust to a number of variations on the base model.
Mots Clés : Formation sur le tas, durée de l'emploi, mobilité sectorielle,
capital humain spécifique au secteur, modèle de durée
paramétrique, modèle à risques concurrents
Keywords : On-the-job training, employment duration, sectoral mobility,
industry-specific human capital, parametric duration models,
competing risks model
JEL : J24, J41, J62
Almost half [of British business people surveyed] pre-
ferred to poach trained workers rather than to educate them;
and more than a third worried that trained people were more
likely to leave the company. 
(The Economist 1997)
1 Introduction
Recent focus on the issue of whether wages rise with tenure or with ex-
perience have revealed the importance of controlling for the industry in
which experience was acquired
1
. A parallel literature has focused on
the eect of formal employer-provided training on wages and mobility
(Barron, Berger & Black 1997, Lynch 1991, Lynch 1992a, Parent forth-
coming). Missing is the link between training and industry mobility.
This paper attempts to redress this lack using data from the National
Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY). We model the transition pattern
of young workers using duration and competing risks models, which al-
lows us to integrate industry mobility. The objective is to document
dierential eects of training on industry stayers as opposed to industry
changers and those workers who leave employment all together.
This paper diers from the previous literature in the way we treat mo-
bility. The analysis in this literature usually concerns only the expected
duration with a given rm conditional on training, without regard to
where the job changer changes to, once she quits her job. Most authors
have used Cox partial likelihood, ignoring the baseline hazard, and can
thus only provide information on the sign, but not the magnitude of
the impact of training (Lynch 1992a, Parent forthcoming). Gritz (1993)
used competing risks models, but considered only the eect of training
on the duration and frequency of employment spells without regard to
either specic jobs nor industry tenure.
Our goal is twofold. The initial quotation points to the worries in-
volved: Are workers more likely to leave their current rm after receipt
of training? Though previous studies have found a positive eect of
training on tenure, we argue that this is not enough, since measured
tenure includes the time spent in training. In this paper, we measure
the eect of training on duration by using parametric duration models.
We nd that the quoted worries, though exaggerated, may be justied.
The statistically signicant impact of training found in previous studies
is not economically signicant.
1
Neal (1995), Parent (1995a). See Altonji & Shakotko (1987), Abraham & Farber
(1987), and Topel (1991) for the framework in which this debate occurs.
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The second concern is a follow-up question to the previous one. When
workers leave, where do they go to, and what information is provided by
mobility patterns? We provide new evidence on the connection between
training and the mobility of the workers concerned, by distinguishing
between intra-sectoral and cross-sectoral mobility as well as exits to non-
employment. We develop a simple inspection-good model of jobs as a
function of (the stock) of human capital, allowing us to distinguish the
degree of specicity of training. This model suggests using a competing
risks model to capture the eect of training on transitions to dierent
states, a model which we favor against a sequential model of separation.
The paper is organized as follows. The following section reviews the
theoretical framework of the impact of training. Section 3 describes
the data and provides some descriptive statistics. Section 4 outlines
the empirical model used and Section 5 presents the results. Section 6
concludes.
2 Theoretical framework
Human capital theory, though primarily interested in the wage and its
remuneration of human capital, has implications as to the mobility of
workers. This obviously depends on the degree of specicity of the hu-
man capital acquired, either through formal or informal training. Its
theoretical predictions, however, are based on a dichotomy between rm-
specic and universally-general capital formation. Recent empirical work
(Neal 1995, Parent 1995a) has shown that this stark dichotomy may be
too imprecise, and the amalgamation of the empirical results into some
theoretical framework is still lacking.
If human capital is general, then the knowledge accumulated is of pro-
ductive use elsewhere irrespective of the company or the sector in which
the training was received. Competitive pressures come to play, ensuring
that workers get the full return on the investment, and consequently
pay for all costs. In equilibrium, the mobility of a trained worker is no
dierent than that of an untrained worker. The mobility aspects follow
from the characteristics of the human capital itself.
2
If human capital is
rm-specic, then theory nds that the returns and costs should be paid
for by the rm, though turnover and transaction cost arguments lead to
some splitting of both (Becker 1993, Hashimoto 1981). Both worker and
2
Transaction costs or other market imperfections may lead to some quasi-rents
in the relation between rm and worker, and to reduced mobility as a consequence
(Acemoglu & Pischke 1996). However, the reduction will be in the baseline mobility,
and investment in general human capital will not aect mobility except under certain
conditions.
2
rm have an increased interest in sticking with the relationship in the
presence of specic capital, and turnover should decrease. Similar results
are obtained from contract theory (MacLeod & Malcomson 1993).
The similar set of predictions may arise frommatching theory (Jovanovic
1979b). A worker will switch rms if her expected match-specic utility
is higher elsewhere. If training is rm-specic, it increases the value of
the rm-worker match, and ceteris paribus decreases the value of other
arriving job oers to the worker, thus probability of the worker switch-
ing rms (Jovanovic 1979a). If, on the other hand, training is general,
then the value of all match draws are increased by the same factor, and
we again obtain that there should be no impact on mobility. Finally, if
training is industry-specic, a combination of the two above arguments
lead to a reduction of mobility across industries, though intra-industry
mobility would not be aected. As a result, conditional on leaving, the
worker is more likely to take up a new job in the same industry.
However, Spence (1974)-like selection models may generate similar
predictions with respect to tenure and completed training
3
. If training
serves as a test to discern good from bad workers, then workers who
have completed training, and thus successfully passed the test, will be
recognized as good workers. If good workers tend to have longer tenures,
then the correlation between (completed) training and tenure is not due
to increased human capital, but due to a separation of the good from
the bad, invisible to an econometrician's eye.
Against this stands a dierent type of selection story. Suppose that
the rm has to choose training recipients among workers whose produc-
tivity is unknown. However, the rm can observe other characteristics
related to a worker's mobility. Then for any type of training for which
the rm pays, the rm will prefer less mobile workers in order to get the
highest possible return on its investment. We would observe a correla-
tion between training and tenure. From a human capital point of view,
this correlation is spurious.
Previous ndings
Most previous empirical studies have concentrated on the eects of train-
ing on wages and the propensity to change jobs without distinguishing
occupational and sectoral changes. On-the-job training (OJT) increases
wages with the current employer. As we have seen, this could be consis-
tent with both general and rm-specic human capital. The literature is
3
E.g. Salop & Salop (1976) and Weiss & Wang (1990). Margolis (1995) provides
evidence for a model of self-selecting workers with heterogeneous hazards into rms
oering dierent seniority rewards.
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not clear on whether employers remunerate OJT received from previous
employers. Lynch (1992b) nds that these returns are nil, whereas Par-
ent (forthcoming) and Loewenstein & Spletzer (1996b), using more rep-
resentative samples and more elaborate techniques, nd that returns to
previously obtained OJT are as high as for training received with the cur-
rent rm, indicating that training is of a general nature. However, OJT
does not seem to be paid for by the employee through reduced starting
wages (Barron et al. 1997, Loewenstein & Spletzer 1996b, Veum 1995a),
which is consistent with the idea that human capital thus formed is of
a (rm-)specic nature. Disagreement occurs on whether these results
are also true for o-the-job training (OFT). Whereas Lynch (1991) nds
that OFT is not remunerated by the current employer, Parent (forth-
coming) shows that returns to training are the same independent of the
type of training, and Veum (1995a) reports that OFT leads to higher
starting wages as long as it is nanced by employers.
Some results reported in the literature lend support to the mobility-
based selection story. For instance, results reported in Lynch (1992b)
indicate that married workers and more experienced workers are signif-
icantly more likely to receive training, where both characteristics are
habitually correlated with longer tenure.
4
Only a few studies have used duration analysis to look at the mobility
patterns associated with training. Estimates of duration models have
shown that the probability of separation from the current employer is
reduced, conditional on having received some OJT (Lynch 1992a, Parent
forthcoming). Combined with the reported results on the wage eects
of training, this is interpreted as evidence for the presence of some rm-
specic component to formal training, or at least in contradiction with
the interpretation of training as portable across employers. In contrast,
a recent paper (Veum 1997) nds no eect of on-the-job training on
tenure.
5
Few previous studies, and none in the training literature, have con-
sidered the distinction between intra-sectoral mobility and cross-sectoral
mobility, focusing only on duration on the job. Neal (1995) and Parent
(1995a) estimate the eects of industry mobility on wages, but do not
consider the determinants of such mobility. Their results showing that
industry tenure explains away the entire rm-specic tenure eect on
wages is a nding which is deeply related to the present paper, since it
points to the presence of sector-specic informal human capital. Neal
(1996) and McCall (1990) go one step further. Neal (1996) addresses the
4
See also Altonji & Spletzer (1991).
5
Veum (1997) uses a slightly dierent classication of training. Furthermore, he
uses a subsample of our dataset.
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question of complexity of job changes. He nds evidence that the propen-
sity for cross-sectoral changes decreases with industry experience, but
does not relate these changes to training variables or job tenure. McCall
(1990) considers occupational matching, nding some evidence that pre-
vious experience in the same occupation increases tenure in the current
job. Thomas (1996) estimates a parametric model of sectoral mobility
for persons experiencing unemployment, distinguishing exits from jobs
only as to voluntary quits or involuntary job losses and neglecting direct
job-to-job transitions. He nds that the probability of changing sectors
increases with the duration of unemployment. Furthermore, tenure on
the previous job increases the duration of unemployment.
A model of sector-specic human capital
Most previous studies have thus been framed by the dichotomy be-
tween rm-specic and completely general capital. Nevertheless, already
Becker had in mind that human capital could be of use elsewhere, but
not necessarily by everybody:
 General training is useful in many rms besides those
providing it; for example, a machinist trained in the army
nds his skills of value in steel and aircraft rms, and a doc-
tor trained at one hospital nds his skills useful at other hos-
pitals.
(Becker 1993, pg. 33)
Hence, some training will be of use only to a restricted subset of all rms
in the economy, and will therefore be less then completely general. On
the other hand, there may well exist training which is truly of use only
to the training rm, and other training, one has only to think of word
processing skills, that will be of use to such a large set of rms that we
can truly say it is completely general.
To x ideas, consider the following model. It is a model of jobs
as inspection goods (Jovanovic 1979b), coupled with the usual assump-
tion of an increase in marginal product due to human capital formation
(Becker 1993). There are two sectors. By convention, the worker is
initially employed in sector 1, receiving a wage w
0
= (k), a positive
function of the stock of human capital (k). For simplicity, we assume a
linear function, (k) = k. The rm pays for the training irrespective
of its specicity, and the worker's wage is increasing in k:  > 0. Oers
w
i
(k) arrive at a constant rate r. A fraction q of oers comes from sector
2. Both sectors are competitive. In each sector, wage oers (the value
5
of worker-rm matches) are normally distributed with mean k
i
and
variance  = 1.
6

i
is the degree of transferability to the rm making
the oer. The worker will switch rms and/or sectors if w
i
(k) > w
0
(k),
which occurs with probability 1 
i
(w
0
(k) w
i
(k)) = S
i
(w
0
). Abstract-
ing from ties, the probability of a sectoral move per period, the inter-
sectoral transition intensity, is 
2
(k) = r  q  S
2
(w
0
). The intra-sectoral
transition intensity is dened equivalently as 
1
(k) = r  (1  q) S
1
(w
0
).
The hazard function (k) is simply the sum of the transition intensities.
The probability of a sectoral move conditional on leaving the current job
is M
2
(k) = 
2
=(
1
+ 
2
) = qS
2
=[(1  q)S
1
+ qS
2
]. Suppose that initially
k = 0, hence all distributions have the same mean.
If training, the process of human capital acquisition, is rm-specic,
then 
1
= 
2
= 0. Industry-specic capital is the case where 
1
= 1 and

2
= 0: training is perfectly portable within the same sector, but not
across sectors. Finally, general training is portable across sectors, hence

1
= 
2
= 1.
Now consider the acquisition of dk units of human capital through
training. Initially, all distributions have mean zero, 
2
(0) = r  q=2,

1
(0) = r  (1  q)=2, (0) = r=2, and M
2
= rq. Assume @w
0
(k)=@k > 0.
If training is rm-specic, then @S
i
(w
0
)=@k < 0 for i = 1; 2. Both
transition intensities decline, and so does the hazard. The conditional
probability of a sectoral moveM
2
(k) is unchanged, since the desirability
of wage oers from both sectors relative to the current wage decline in
the same manner.
If training is industry specic, we obtain @
2
(k)=@k < 0, but @
1
(k)=@k =
0, since the mean productivity for other rms in the same sector in-
creases by the same amount as for the present rm. This implies that
the conditional probability of a sectoral move M
2
(k) decreases, since
sign(@M
2
(k)=@k) = sign(
1
@
2
=k   
2
@
1
=@k) < 0. Note that the haz-
ard  also declines, although by less than in the rm-specic case.
Finally, if training is general, then both transitions intensities remain
unchanged, as does the overall hazard. Furthermore, as in the rm-
specic case, @M
2
(k)=k = 0, since the desirability of wage oers from
both sectors increase in the same manner.
This model can easily be extended to include non-employment as a
third sector. Wage oers from the non-employment sector can be in-
terpreted as shocks to the reservation wage. Assume that w
3
(k) = 0, i.e.
human capital has no eect on leisure. The hazard is now dened as the
sum over all three transition intensities. Dene M
job
= (
1
+ 
2
)=, the
6
We assume that the variance is equal across sectors. This is a sucient condition,
but not necessary for our results to hold.
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Table 1: Theoretical implications
Derivative of  
2

1

3
M
2
M
job
with respect to:
On-the-job training with current employer
Firm-specic < 0 < 0 < 0 < 0 = 0 = 0
Industry-specic < 0 < 0 = 0 < 0 < 0 > 0
General < 0 = 0 = 0 < 0 = 0 > 0
On-the-job training with previous employer,
dierent industry
Firm-specic = 0 = 0 = 0 = 0 = 0 = 0
Industry-specic > 0 > 0 = 0 = 0 > 0 > 0
General < 0 = 0 = 0 < 0 = 0 > 0
On-the-job training with previous employer,
same industry
Firm-specic = 0 = 0 = 0 = 0 = 0 = 0
Industry-specic < 0 < 0 = 0 < 0 < 0 > 0
General < 0 = 0 = 0 < 0 = 0 > 0

1
is transition intensity to same industry, 
2
to other industry, 
3
to non-
employment. M
2
is the probability of changing sectors conditional on switching
jobs and on t, and M
job
is the conditional probability of being employed after
leaving the current job in t.
conditional probability of nding a job. Under the above assumptions,

3
always declines in k. Hence, for 
1
= 
2
= 0, @M
job
=@k = 0, but for
the other two cases, @M
job
=@k > 0. This is another way of saying that
(conditional) labor force attachment increases with training if training
is not rm-specic. Table 1 summarizes the implications.
Though essentially a model of job quits, the implications also have
implications as to training received in previous jobs, where separation
may have occurred as a layo. If training received on previous jobs was
rm-specic, then in subsequent jobs, it is as if the worker had never
received this training, and previously received training should have no
impact on any of the above measures. In particular, the eect of such
training on the hazard should be nil. If training is industry-specic,
7
it obviously depends on whether training was acquired in the same in-
dustry or not. If it was, then we obtain the same predictions as for
industry-specic capital above, as if the current company itself had pro-
vided the industry-specic training. On the other hand, if it was not,
then the eect is the same as for previously acquired rm-specic capital,
i.e. zero. Finally, if training is general in nature, then the only eects
are a reduction in the transition intensity to non-employment and as a
consequence, an increase in conditional labor force attachment.
Procedural outline
In this paper, we take a closer look at mobility patterns of workers in the
National Longitudinal Survey of Youth. First, we estimate parametric
duration models. In order to discern a tenure-lengthening eect of on-
the-job training, we argue that tenure should increase by more than
the time spent in the training program itself. The increase needs to be
greater than the (full-time) equivalent of the duration of the training
program itself for there to be an economic impact of training. Hence,
if a 10-week training program increases expected tenure by 10 weeks,
we argue that the economic impact, the net increase is nil. Our results
show that, in general, training has no such economic impact on tenure,
casting doubt on the interpretation of training as rm-specic human
capital.
Is the measure of net increase appropriate? In the sense that for-
mal training is usually dispensed in a classroom setting, separate from
productive activities, this seems to us uncontroversial. In the case of
apprenticeships, this may be less so, since apprenticeships are a mix
of learning-by-doing and classroom settings. However, even in the case
of apprenticeships, the net increase will give us an indication of how
strong the tenure eect of training truly is.
We then proceed to estimate the conditional probabilities as sug-
gested by the above model in a competing risks framework. If training
does in fact contain a rm-specic component, then we would expect
training to signicantly reduce exits to all destinations, which is already
reected in a reduction of the overall job separation hazard. If training
is industry-specic, we would expect no eect on intra-sectoral mobil-
ity, and a negative eect on inter-sectoral mobility. Finally, a nding
that training has no eect on mobility is consistent with general human
capital.
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3 Data
The National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY) has followed 12,686
individuals since 1979, originally selected for being between 14 and 21
years of age. The survey tracks (among other things) their employment,
schooling and training. We use data from all waves of the NLSY up until
1993. Jobs are excluded if their starting dates are before 1979. We use all
reported training spells to compute total training (excluding education)
received. However, it should be pointed out that prior to 1987, only
training spells longer than 4 weeks were reported, and this might bias
the controls for previous training received. The only alternative, i.e.
taking into account persons who entered the labor force after 1986,
7
is
even less attractive as an alternative. Individuals who have their rst job
contact after 1986 are at least 21 years old, and this cannot be considered
a representative sample even of the youth population.
A further constraint could be that the NLSY contains information
on a maximum of ve job spells and four training spells having occurred
since the last interview. In practice, only about one percent of persons
holding at least one job since the last interview also provide information
on a fth job, and on average only 1.6 percent of those receiving at least
one training spell also provide information on a third or fourth training
spell.
8
Thus, this restriction does not seem to impose a major constraint.
In our analysis, we exclude persons in the military subsample and
not working for private companies.
9
We also exclude workers who have
not entered the labor force on a permanent basis. To be included, a
worker had to work for at least 25 weeks and on average at least 30
hours per week for at least 3 of the next 5 years. For these individu-
als, we keep all valid observations, including those before the permanent
transition, arguing that training may be received before the worker per-
manently transits into the work force.
10
The nal sample includes 41
126 observations for 8 088 individuals. For the econometric analysis, we
also eliminate all job spells less than 4 weeks in length. Table 2 provides
7
No training questions were asked in 1987. However, the questions in 1988 refer
to training received since 1986/ last interview.
8
To be more precise: In the years in which up to three training spells of at least
4 weeks could be reported, only 0.52 percent of those receiving at least one training
spell also reported a third training spell. In later years, respondents were asked about
a maximum of 4 spells of at least a week in length, and the corresponding number
then is 2.2 percent.
9
We also experimented with excluding the oversampled population, which reduces
the sample size to 24 618 observations for 4 610 individuals. Since the results did not
change, we used all observations for the results reported here.
10
None of the results seem to change if we include workers not satisfying this
criterion.
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Table 2: Sample selection
No. obs. No. persons
Base sample 12,686
valid job observations 102,307 12,342
excl. military sample 97,795 11,254
excl. non-private co. 69,054 10,963
excl. missing variables 54,467 10,357
excl. jobs starting before Jan.1, 1979 47,645 9,791
Only permanent transitions 41,126 8,088
Spells > 4 weeks 40,059 8,058
more details.
11
Sample means for the full sample and the subsample
with strictly positive training are given in Table 6.
Time frame for search activities
To construct transition data, we need to dene appropriate exit states.
In the simplest transition model, the state following an employment spell
can be easily dened. A person is either employed in another job, which
might be in the same or in a dierent industry. She may have enlisted in
the military, she may be unemployed or have withdrawn from the labor
market. In this paper, we will describe three dierent types of transitions
only: transitions to jobs within the same industry, transitions to jobs in
11
Parent (forthcoming) uses essentially the same sample minus two years. His nal
sample only includes 8,097 observations. However, his exclusion restrictions are more
severe. Using a four years instead of his six to exclude transitory workers leaves
us with a larger sample (see previous footnote). Furthermore, he excludes workers
with less than two completed spells. In our sample, about 10 percent of all spells
are censored. Finally, and perhaps the major dierence, he excludes all workers
occupying more than one job at the same time. We have not implemented this
distinction. We base our identication of transitions on the primary job code in the
work history data le of the NLSY. Ignoring the presence of dual jobs, we may capture
some job-to-job transitions which are in fact only a reallocation of time towards the
second job. In a certain sense, this is also a job and possibly an industry transition.
Furthermore, we believe, though we have not checked, that on-the-job (though not
o-the-job) training will occur with the employer with whom the worker works the
highest number of hours, which is the criterion used to designate the primary job in
the work history le, and that it is unlikely that a worker will receive training with
two employers simultaneously. However, we acknowledge that the impact of these
restrictions remains to be evaluated.
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a dierent two-digit
12
industry, and non-employment, which groups not
only the obvious economic denition, but also those transitions which
end in military enlistment.
However, in doing this, we have not completely solved our problem.
Since our model is a partial equilibrium model using single-cycle data, we
need to do some aggregation in the temporal dimension. In other words,
when a person leaves a job, when does she arrive in the new state? If this
person suers 2 days of unemployment between two jobs, do we classify
this transition as a transition to a new job, or to unemployment? What
if the unemployment spell between two jobs is three months? In a more
complete, multiple-cycle analysis, we would include the eect of previous
on-the-job training on the probability of exiting from unemployment, and
this question would not be a problem. However, to keep the econometrics
a bit simpler, we introduce some simplications, and heuristically test
for their impact later.
We thus argue that the rst transition should be coded as a job-
to-job transition, since it is more likely that the new job was lined up
before the old job ended than otherwise,
13
and that hence unemployment
(or non-employment) is likely to be voluntary. The second transition,
however, should be coded as a job-to-unemployment transition, again on
the grounds that it is more likely that unemployment was involuntary,
rather than voluntary. More precisely, we assume that any job found
within a window of s weeks of having left another job qualies as a job-
to-job transition. In other words, after having left one job at time t, any
unemployment spell from t to t+ s is not taken into account. We then
test the robustness of our results to several dierent values of s.
Table 3: Exit frequencies
as a function of window size
Window size in weeks 1 5 13
Job in other industry 19.6 27.8 32.5
Job in same industry 12.3 19.6 22.5
Non-employment 57.9 42.0 33.6
Total number of observations: 40 059.
12
See Table 5 for the industry grouping we use. One-and-a-half digit industry
would be more appropriate, since our classication is wider than one-digit SIC, but
narrower than two-digit SIC.
13
Some control for lined-up jobs is possible, since in some years, respondents were
asked specically if they had a new job lined up before leaving their last job. In the
present analysis, we have not yet integrated this question.
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Information on training spells
A total of 11 categories have been allowed over the years for classication
of the training institution. The job to be trained for is registered, as well
as duration, intensity and if training was successfully completed. As
interest in training increased over the years, supplementary questions
were added. Thus, since 1988, the respondent was asked whether her
employer had sponsored training, if the training was used on the job,
if it helped or was necessary to get a promotion, whether it helped in
getting a dierent job, etc. Questions were asked about the respondent's
evaluation of transferability of the training received to other tasks and
employers.
We group three categories of training as on-the-job training.
14
Ap-
prenticeships are obviously on-the-job, as are training programs run by
the employer. We further classify training provided at work by out-
side suppliers as on-the-job training, arguing that this is also likely to
be organized by the employers. All other training codes are considered
o-the-job training.
15
Training is a variable which by denition varies within a job, and an
appropriate econometric model should allow for time-varying covariates.
In this paper, we approximate the impact of time-varying training by
using completed hours of training at the time the worker leaves the rm.
Our companion paper extends this analysis to time-varying variables.
16
We also experiment with training intensity, dened as hours of training
per week of tenure, and computed using as above total hours of training
received and total weeks of tenure. Note that the rst measure covaries
in a mechanical fashion with tenure, since an employee cannot receive 10
weeks of training on a job that lasts 5 weeks. The second measure is a
correct measure if training intensities were to be dened at the start of
the job, and if they did not vary over time. A large percentage of training
occurs at the start of a job spell, but the proportion of training in later
years is not nil (Parent forthcoming, Loewenstein & Spletzer 1996a).
The results reported here should hence be interpreted with caution.
Preliminary data analysis
Some preliminary analysis is appropriate. In order to choose an appro-
priate baseline hazard, a plot of the raw hazard rate is of use to obtain
14
See Table 4 for the complete listing of job categories.
15
A dierent approach, taken by Veum (1995b, 1997), is to use the information
provided since 1988 on who paid for the direct costs of training.
16
Parent (forthcoming) and Veum (1997) use the same method. Lynch (1992a)
uses a time-varying specication.
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some idea of the form of the baseline hazard. Panel 1 of Figure 1 shows
the usual form of the exit hazard (Kaplan-Meier estimates), with a large
peak at around 12 weeks, as rst noted by Farber (1994). Note that the
hazard is non-monotonous, hence Weibull or exponential hazard models
are would seem inappropriate.
The other panels of Figure 1 show plots obtained by graphing empir-
ical transition intensities to the appropriate states using dierent values
for the size of the transition window, again using Kaplan-Meier esti-
mators. The functional form of transition intensities seems to remain
the same, and does not seem to dier across exit states, although transi-
tions to same industry jobs decline less rapidly after the peak in the 12th
week.
17
Note that the hazard for industry movers always lies above the
hazard for industry stayers. The implication, as also reported by Table
3, is that young workers frequently change industry. It possibly reects
search and matching activities (Neal 1996). Furthermore, it would ap-
pear that the (relative) probability of observing a change of industries
rather than a job in the same industry is not time-constant, a point we
will approach formally in the next two sections.
Figure 2 in the Appendix shows how each transition intensities evolves
when we change the size of the transition window. Enlargening the
length of the transition window increases both job transition intensi-
ties by reducing the number of individuals who are classied as non-
employed, though the transition intensity to jobs in other industries
seems to grow more strongly.
18
. Note that the largest increase oc-
curs when enlargening the window size from one to ve weeks, whereas
enlargening it further to thirteen weeks has a proportionately smaller
eect. In most of our analysis, we thus report results using a window
size of ve weeks.
Table 6 shows means of most relevant variables for the full sample
and for the restricted sample with strictly positive on-the-job training.
The subsample diers from the full sample in several aspects. Trained
workers have more experience, work longer hours, are more likely to be
unionized. Related to our parameters of interest, they have higher (ini-
tial) wages and longer jobs, as seen both in completed tenure and in the
number of right-censored jobs, i.e. the balance of the destination frequen-
cies. Turning to the sample frequencies of the three exit states, trained
workers appear to be more likely to avoid non-employment when leaving
17
No formal tests have been performed, and our methodology in the competing risk
framework used here does not depend on the form of the hazard.
18
Thomas (1996) shows that the probability of changing industries increases relative
to the probability of nding a job in the same industry when explicitly modeling
unemployment durations.
13
a job. Furthermore, as a rst indication of a possible industry-specicity
of training, conditional on nding a job within ve weeks, trained workers
are more likely to nd a job in the same industry.
19
Thus, the dier-
ence in sample frequencies of destinations between trained workers and
the full sample would lead us to conclude that training confers industry-
specic skills. The dierence in transitions to non-employment indicates
an increase in labor force attachment, which would seem inconsistent
with pure rm-specicity of training. These observations provide a sug-
gestive starting point for the duration analysis in the following chapters.
In the next section, we develop a multivariate framework giving us
more insight into the relation between inter and intra-sectoral transi-
tions.
4 Empirical framework
In this section, we give a brief review of the econometric models used
20
.
We rst go into some detail concerning the duration (single exit) model,
which is similar to the models used in previous papers. The multiple
destination model follows. We then derive two specializations, the com-
peting risks model and a sequential, or separable, model. As we show, it
is possible to distinguish between the two models in the data by a fairly
intuitive test, allowing us to concentrate on the appropriate model in
further analysis.
4.1 Single exit duration models
Duration models are based on a random variable T representing the time
until exit from a job. The hazard rate (t) is dened as the (instanta-
neous) probability of an event occuring in period t, conditional on the
event not having occured until now:
(t) = lim
dt!0
Prob(t < T  t+ dtjT > t)=dt (1)
and is equal to f(t)=S(t), where S(t) is the survivor function 1   F (t),
and f(t) =  dS(t)=dt the density. Thus, the hazard can also be written
19
The balance of destinations are censored observations: individuals who either
disappeared (temporarily) from the dataset, for whom it was impossible to reconstruct
in what industry they detained their next job, or who are still at their job at the last
interview during that job tenure (non-movers).
20
For a more extensive expostion, see Lancaster (1990)
14
as (t) =  @lnS(t)=@t. From this, a useful identity is
S(t) = exp( 
Z
t
0
(s)ds): (2)
It can be shown that the integrated hazard has a unit exponential dis-
tribution. Specication of the hazard rate denes the distribution of
durations, and vice versa.
Covariates can be modeled to aect the distribution in various ways.
The parametric methods used in this paper assume an accelerated failure-
time model:
T = k
1
(t)k
2
(x) (3)
where k
1
(t) is a transformtion of time, and k
2
(x) a proportionality fac-
tor. Hence, any two persons diering in their x's have the same baseline
duration distribution of k
1
(t), but dier in their observed event times by
a constant proportional factor of k
2
(x
1
)=k
2
(x
2
). In the simplest spec-
ication, k
1
(t) = t and k
2
(x) = exp( X). Throughout this paper,
the specication of the proportionality function in exponential form is
maintained. This allows us to rewrite (3) as a linear regression model:
logT  X = u: (4)
In the case of a constant hazard, logT  X is just the integrated haz-
ard, which implies that exp(u) follows an Exponential distribution, but
generalizations lead to Weibull, Gamma, and Normal distributions
21
. If
u had a normal distribution and censoring were not a problem, this could
be estimated by OLS. However, most data contains censored spells, and
this needs to be reected in the likelihood.
Another possibility is the proportional hazard specication:
(t;x) =
~
k
1
(t)
~
k
2
(x) (5)
In this case,
~
k
1
(t) is the baseline hazard function common to all individ-
uals. Now, two persons diering in their x's dier in their hazard by a
constant proportionality factor of
~
k
2
(x
1
)=
~
k
2
(x
2
).
The advantage inherent to proportional hazard models is the pos-
sibility of estimating
~
k
2
(x) independently of the baseline hazard in a
partial likelihood approach (Cox 1972). However, inference as to the
expected duration is not possible. On the other hand, it's ease of use
allows inference on a number of other dimensions, as we will see further
on.
21
See Lancaster (1990) for more details.
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In both cases, the (log-)likelihood contribution of an observed exit
from employment is just f(u) if not censored, and S(u) if censored, and
using f(t) = (t)S(t), we can write this as
l =
X
i
(1  c
i
) log(u
i
) + logS(u
i
) (6)
where c
i
is an indicator variable equal to unity if an observation is cen-
sored.
Choice of the wrong distribution in estimation may lead to misspec-
ication and hence biased results, particularly in duration analysis
22
.
However, for inference on the quantitative eect of the covariates, speci-
fying the duration distribution is useful. Following the preliminary anal-
ysis in the previous section, we decided to use distribution functions
which allow for single-peaked hazards. The present paper presents re-
sults using Gamma and log-normal specications, with some results also
available for the (monotonous hazard) Weibull specication. The results
we obtain are of course conditional on having chosen the correct baseline
hazard .
For some of our results, it is not necessary to know the distribution of
duration. In the case of a proportional hazard model, a partial likelihood
can be derived. Denote by t(j) the jth observed exit time, x(j) the
characteristics of the individual exiting at time t(j), and R
j
the risk set
at t(j), i.e. the individuals who could still have exited at this time. Then
the (Cox) partial likelihood is
l =
J
X
j=1
2
4
log
~
k
2
(x(j))   log
X
k2R
j
~
k
2
(x(j))
3
5
(7)
which does not depend on
~
k
1
(t). Furthermore, by simply redening the
risk set R
j
to include only multiple observations for the same individual,
it is straightforward to control for (multiplicative) individual heterogene-
ity in the hazard function.
23
We will use the partial likelihood approach
in the analysis of multiple destinations, as explained in the next section.
4.2 Multiple destinations
The analogous quantity to the hazard rate in a multiple destination
framework is the transition intensity 
m
(t;x). Let d
m
be a dummy vari-
able equal to unity if exit occurs to destination m. Then the transition
22
(Meyer 1990, Sueyoshi 1992). (McCall 1990) compares Weibull estimates with
semi-parametric estimates.
23
See Lancaster (1990) for more details.
16
intensity is dened as the (instantaneous) probability of departure to
destination m given survival to t

m
(t;x) = lim
dt!0
Prob(t < T  t+ dt; d
m
= 1jT > t;x)=dt (8)
The hazard function is equal to the sum of transition intensities over all
possible destinations m:
(t;x) =
M
X
m=1

m
(t;x) (9)
and the survivor function is dened as by (2).
For any given individual, we observe a M -vector of indicators fd
m
g
and exit time t, besides the covariates x
24
. The contribution to the
likelihood is given by the probability that she left for destination m at
time t:
P (left for m at time t) = 
m
(t;x)S(t;x) (10)
which can be rewritten as
p(d
1
; : : : ; d
m
; t;x) = exp
(
 
Z
1
0
M
X
m=1

m
(s)ds
)
M
Y
m=1

m
(t;x)
d
m
(11)
For our purposes, it is useful to specify a number of dierent prob-
abilities. First, dene the marginal probabilities of the destinations, i.e.
the probability that when exit occurs, it occurs to destination m. Inte-
grating (10) over t yields

m
=
Z
1
0
S(s)
m
(s)ds: (12)
Another useful measure is the probability of choosing destination m over
destination k, where fm; kg is a subset of M . For instance, as pointed
out in Section 2, we are interested in the probability of changing sectors,
conditional on switching jobs and on t, and the probability of nding
a job, conditional on leaving the current job and on t. With (10), the
former can be seen to be
M
2
(t) =
P (left for sector 2 in period t)
P (left for sector 2 in period t) + P (left for sector1 in period t)
24
Note that censoring in this context can be modeled as another destination, and
a censoring indicator can thus be subsumed into the M indicators.
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as h! 0 and thus
=

2
(t;x)

1
(t;x) + 
2
(t;x)
(13)
where period t is understood to mean between t and t+ h. In gen-
eral, M
2
(t) is time-dependent and will depend on the estimated baseline
hazards for each risk. However, in the context of the proportional hazard
model, with k
2
(x) = exp(x), the sign of the derivative of M
2
(t) with
respect to a covariate x
j
is time-invariant:
@M
2
(t)
@x
j
=

2
(t)
2j
 (
1
(t) + 
2
(t))  
2
(t)  (
1
(t)
1j
+ 
2
(t)
2j
)
[
1
(t) + 
2
(t)]
2
=

1
(t)
2
(t)
[
1
(t) + 
2
(t)]
2
(
2j
  
1j
) (14)
Thus, sign(@M
2
(t)=@x
j
) = sign(
2j
  
1j
), which does not depend on
the destination-specic hazards, a very useful property of the propor-
tional hazard models. The probability of nding a job once the current
job has ended was dened in Section 2 as
M
job
(t) =

1
(t) + 
2
(t)
(t)
(15)
where (t) is dened as in (9) as the sum of the destination-specic
transition intensities. The derivative of (15) with respect to a covariate
x
j
is
@M
job
(t)
@X
j
=

3
(t)
[
P
3
i=1

i
(t)]
2
[
1
(t)(
1j
  
3j
) + 
2
(t)(
2j
  
3j
)] :(16)
which may be of ambiguous sign. However, by aggregating all job exits
irrespective of industry of the next job held, i.e. 
job
= 
1
+ 
2
, we nd
an equivalent expression to (14), which can be unambiguously signed.
4.3 Competing risk model
Now consider a person drawing from M independent distributions of
tenure f
m
(t
m
), hazards 
m
, and survivor functions S
m
(t
m
) = expf
R
t
m
0

m
(s)dsg.
Each represents the risk of exiting from the present job to destination m.
However, only the smallest realization t = min
m
ft
m
g is observed, hence
the term competing. All other draws are (right-)censored. Then the
likelihood of observing an exit to destination m is the product of the
observed density of distribution m, 
m
(t)S
m
(t) and the probability that
18
all other draws are larger than t,
Q
j 6=m
S
j
(t). Using (2) and the inde-
pendence of t
m
,
P (exit to m in period t) = 
m
(t)S
m
(t)
Y
j 6=m
S
j
(t) (17)
= 
m
(t) exp

 
Z
t
0

m
(s)ds

exp
8
<
:
 
X
j 6=m
Z
t
0

j
(s)ds
9
=
;
= 
m
(t) exp
8
<
:
 
X
j
Z
t
0

j
(s)ds
9
=
;
= 
m
(t)S(t): (18)
It can be seen that (18) is equivalent to (10) with 
m
(t) = 
m
(t). On
the other hand, using (17) to write the likelihood of an individual obser-
vation,
p(d
1
; : : : ; d
m
; t;x) =
M
Y
m=1
8
<
:

m
(u)S
m
(u)
M
Y
j 6=m
S
j
(u)
9
=
;
d
m
=
M
Y
m=1

m
(u)
d
m
M
Y
m=1
S
m
(u)
=
M
Y
m=1
L
m
(19)
where independence of the distributions of all T
m
was assumed, and
L
m
= 
m
(u)
d
m
S(u)
m
. Since L
m
is equivalent to the (log-)likelihood
of a duration model given by (6), it can be estimated separately. The
contribution of an observed exit to destination n 6= m to likelihood
L
m
is thus the same as that of a censored observation in the duration
model. Again, a partial likelihood can be derived in the case of the
proportional hazards model, where the model partial likelihood is the
product of the destination-specic partial likelihoods.
25
The assumption
of independence is restrictive, though often seen in the literature.
26
4.4 Sequential model
It is of interest to distinguish the competing risks model from another
specialisation of the multiple destination model. Call it a sequential
25
See Lancaster (1990), Chapter 9, for more details.
26
E.g. Belzil (1993), Booth & Satchell (1993)
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model, for reasons which will become apparent. Consider the case where
transition intensities are identical up to a time-independent proportion-
ality factor k
2m
, i.e.,

m
(t) = k
1
(t; x)k
2m
(x;
m
) (20)
Using (9) and cancelling out the common factor k
1
(t; x), we obtain a
proportional intensity model with proportionality factor 
m
dened as

m
(t;x)
(t;x)
=
k
2m
(x;
m
)
P
M
j=1
k
2j
(x;
m
)
= 
m
8k (21)
Then the marginal probability of destination m as dened by (12) can
be written as

m
=
Z
1
0
S(s)
m
(s)ds
= 
m
Z
1
0
S(s)(s)ds
= 
m
Z
1
0
S(s)
f(s)
S(s)
ds
= 
m
Thus, 
m
, the probability that when exit occurs, it occurs to destination
m is simply the proportionality factor associated with transition intensity
m. If k
2
(x;
m
) = exp( x
m
), then 
m
and the marginal probability

m
take the form of a logit model:

m
= 
m
=
exp( x
m
)
P
K
j=1
exp( x
j
)
(22)
Note that the commonality of time-dependent components of the haz-
ard across destinations is a necessary condition for this result to hold.
Assume it does not. Then 
m
is a function of time and

m
=
Z
1
0
S(s)
m
(s)ds
=
Z
1
0
S(s)(s)
m
(s)ds
=
Z
1
0

m
(s)f(s)ds
which cannot be estimated as a standard logit model. In fact, since in
this case the baseline transition intensities dier across destinations, it
is more appropriate to use the competing risks model.
20
If the assumption holds, we can rewrite the model as

m
(t;x; ) = k
1
(t; x
1
;
1
)k
2m
(x
2
;
2m
) (23)
where x
1
are the variables included in the estimation of the common
baseline hazard, x
2
are those included in the estimation of the marginal
probabilies of destinations (possibly overlapping), and 
j
, j = 1; 2 the
parameters associated with each model. This is why we call this a se-
quential model : It implies that the process determining spell duration
is completely separable from the process determining destination. In
other words, there is one set of parameters determining when a worker
leaves a rm, and another set of parameters determining her labor mar-
ket activity afterwards. Each component can be estimated separately to
obtain consistent estimates of the s, k
1
as a standard duration model,
k
2
as multinomial logit (or probit)
27
. The logit model thus denes the
likelihood for all observations conditional on separation.
An obvious implication is that inference as to the eect of covariates
on the length of jobs will not be aected by the extension to multiple
exit states. By including training variables in x
2
, the eect of training
on the choice of sector after job separation can be analyzed. Note that
we can compute the signs of @M
2
=@x
j
and @M
job
=@x
j
from the logit
estimates in the same way as for the proportional hazard model.
A simple test can be performed between the appropriateness of the
sequential or the competing-risks formulation by estimating a logit model
of choice of destination on all person-jobs which have ended, irrespective
how long the preceding job. Under the null hypothesis of the appropri-
ateness of (20), the logit model does not depend on tenure on the last
job held. We present results for this test in the empirical section.
5 Results
We start out with a discussion of the results obtained in the single-exit
duration model, as these results are comparable with those obtained by
other authors (Parent 1995b, Lynch 1992b).
5.1 Duration analysis
Panel (a) of Table 7 reports estimates of the eect of training variables
using gamma, log-normal and Weibull distributions of duration. The
qualitative results are robust to the specication of the baseline distri-
bution, and in the discussion below, we concentrate on results obtained
27
Of course, we are assuming that errors for each component are independent.
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for the gamma distribution.
28
The training variables are all signicant,
and of substantial impact. Consistent with previous results, training on
the current job and o-the-job training increase expected tenure, whereas
training received on previous jobs increases mobility.
Contrary to previous studies, the use of a parametric duration dis-
tribution allows us to perform some inference on expected durations.
Computing the expected tenure with and without training permits us
to quantify the net impact of on-the-job training, i.e. the increase in
expected tenure after time spent on the training program, measured as
full-time equivalent weeks, has been deducted. The following example,
results for which are reported in Table 8, will serve to clarify this.
Consider an individual having 4 years of labor market experience
acquired on three dierent jobs with no previous training, and working
35 hours on the current job. This is an average individual in our
sample. His
29
expected tenure will then be approximately 107 weeks.
Assuming he receives training, he can expect to spend about 320 hours on
training over the duration of the current job, or about 9 weeks of full time
equivalent.
30
Training increases his expected tenure by about 6.82 weeks,
with an upper bound of the two-sided 95 percent condence interval of
8.73 weeks. Expressed in expected average weekly hazards, the value is
0.94 percent before training. Training decreases the expected average
value to 0.88 percent, but subtracting the duration of the training spell
from total expected tenure and recomputing training intensity, the net
hazard is 0.96 - slightly higher than without the training spell. The
result also holds when using the log-normal distribution.
Another possibility is to compute the impact on the average median
worker.
31
The median worker in our sample has an expected duration
of 45.99 weeks. Setting hours of training to zero leads to an expected
duration of 45.33 weeks. If all workers were then trained for 320 hours,
the median worker's expected duration rises to 53 weeks.
32
28
The Weibull model is a restricted versions of the Gamma distribution. The
relevant parameter restrictions can be rejected at the 1 percent level. The Log-
normal specication is rejected on the basis of a LR test with test statistic of 938.3.
The statistic is 
2
(1), with a 1 percent critical value of 6.635.
29
The coecient on the included dummy for the sex of the individual is small, on
the order of one percent, and not signicant on a 5 percent level.
30
Again, these numbers approximately reect sample averages. The sample mean
of hours worked per week is 36.26 hours.
31
Formally, we compute the expected duration evaluated at the .5 percentile for
the whole sample, and take the average.
32
Performing the same exercise with the log-normal distribution of tenure leads to
values of 55.63, 54.36, and 68.61 weeks, with a lower bound of the condence interval
on the latter value at 63.28 weeks. This reects the form of the duration distribution,
which is more tail-heavy for the log-normal. The conclusion, however, still holds.
22
In the current specication, we do not control for heterogeneity in
the parametric models. Results from the partial likelihood estimates re-
ported later show that controlling for heterogeneity is likely to increase
the eect of training. The resultant increase of the parameter on train-
ing in the Cox partial likelihood is on the order of 40 percent, with
associated standard errors about twice as large. Results would still hold
approximately.
This example illustrates a rst conclusion of this paper: We cannot
reject the hypothesis that the increase in tenure is actually less than the
time spent on the training program, and that training thus has no net
impact on tenure with the rm providing the training. Another way to
put this result is that the estimated increase in expected tenure due to
training can be fully attributed to the length of the training spell it-
self. In other words, expected training does not increase the net working
time the worker spends with the training employer, conrming, it seems,
popular fears as expressed in the initial quotation. The same result ob-
tains if we include weeks of training rather than total hours of training
over expected tenure. This result obviously depends on the specication
of the duration distribution, but it seems robust to variations thereof.
It holds for the typical and for the median worker, suggesting that,
though positive, the impact of training on tenure may have been over-
stated.
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Of course it can be argued that though it does not hold for
the median worker, there are still workers for whom the net impact is
positive. Our aim here is not to assert that there is never any eect, but
to cast doubt on the assertion that there always is positive eect.
The question then arises whether training actually confers rm-specic
abilities, as has been the general conclusion in the literature. The results
here cast doubt on that conclusion. An analysis of the mobility eects
of training may allow to answer this question, and will be the subject of
the next subsections.
5.2 Sequential model
As a rst step to the estimation of transition intensities, we add to the
previous single-exit duration model a multinomial logit model of sectoral
allocation
34
process. The underlying assumption here is that the single-
exit model correctly captures the determinants of exit, of which training
does not seem to be one, but that a second-stage model of sectoral
33
In results not reported here, we have performed a fair amount of sensitiviy anal-
ysis, and the results are quite robust to sample selection and specication issues
34
To ease terminology, we treat non-employment as another sector.
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allocation is required. In other words, the duration model captures any
factors common to all three destinations.
Panel (a) of Table 9 presents multinomial logit estimates of the
reduced-form parameters of sectoral allocation, the three categories be-
ing the usual ones used in this paper.
35
The probability of entering
non-employment conditional on leaving a job decreases with experience
and tenure. Unionized workers are more likely to nd a job than non-
unionized workers, but the number of jobs held in the past decreases
the probability of nding a job. However, these variables do not seem
to aect the probability of a sectoral change. On the other hand, the
probability of a sectoral change decreases with experience at the start of
the job and with hours worked on the job.
Turning to the training variables, the most striking result is the ab-
sence of any eect of training with the last employer. Neither the prob-
ability of employment nor the probability of sectoral change are aected
by training with the last employer. More in line with a model of sector-
specic training, training received with previous employers in the same
industry (other industries) decreases (increases) the probability of sec-
toral move.
36
Also of interest here, o-the-job training decreases the probability of
a sectoral change. One possible interpretation is that o-the-job training
may lead to career advancement in the same industry.
Adding to these results those from the previous section, we could con-
clude that on-the-job training neither increases tenure with the training
rm in an economically meaningful way, nor aects sectoral allocation.
Both results are consistent with a model of general training. This would
obviously conict with the interpretation we can give to the coecients
on training received with previous employers.
However, the model does not pass the test expounded in Section 4.4.
The coecient on tenure in the last job before separation is signicantly
greater than zero. Furthermore, results for a exible specication in
tenure reported in Panel (b) show that the time dependency for all three
destinations dier substantially.
37
Hence, our test rejects the appropri-
ateness of the sequential model, and we would favor a competing risks
model. And the result that training has no eect on sectoral allocation
must seem premature at this stage .
35
The transition window in Table 9 is set to ve weeks. Results for windows of one
and nine weeks do not dier signicantly.
36
All dierences in coecients are signicantly dierent from zero at the 5 percent
level.
37
The joint hypothesis that tenure has no eect in all destinations can be easily
rejected.
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5.3 Competing risks
As a next step, we estimate a competing risks model in a proportional
hazards setting. This allows us to quantify the impact of training on
each destination-specic risk as well as on the probability of a sectoral
move and on labor force attachment. Contrary to the sequential model
previously estimated, time to exit and choice of exit are modeled jointly.
Table 10 reports coecients on training variables.
38
Column (a) is the
hazard model as already reported earlier. Columns (b) through (d) re-
port coecients from a model with the three competing destinations job
in a dierent industry, jobs in the same industry, and no job found,
non-employed. Column (e) reports coecients when aggregating the
two former categories into a category job found without distinguish-
ing the industry in which the next job is located. The results were
obtained assuming a transition window of ve weeks.
The eects of other variables (reported in Table 13 in the appendix)
are as follows. Women are less likely to change sector, and more likely
to transit into non-employment than men, though no dierences seem to
exist as to the transition intensity to same-industry jobs. In all transi-
tion intensities, education has no signicant eect. Experience increases
transition intensities to both industries, but reduces transitions out of
employment. Though this might seem counter-intuitive at rst glance,
remember that the eect on the overall hazard is negative, thus imply-
ing that more experienced workers are less likely to separate from their
current job, but upon separation are more likely to stay employed. The
number of jobs ever held decreases both job transitions, but increases the
transition intensity to non-employment, possibly serving as an indicator
for people with a lower labor force attachment. Usual hours worked on
the current job are correlated with lower transition intensities out of the
current industry, but increases the intra-sectoral transition intensity.
39
Jobs with higher initial wages are correlated with lower transition inten-
sities to job in other industries and out of employment, but wages have
no eect on intra-sectoral transition intensities.
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See appendix for complete results. Estimates using the accelerated failure-time
models of Section 5.1 yielded the same signs for the training variables, but in those
models, the sign of the probability of sectoral change depends on all coecients of the
model, and can only be approximated by the comparison we provide here. Results
for those models are available on demand.
39
This may be coherent with a multidimensional utility function and the idea that
hours worked is an industry characteristic. Since the mean industry-specic eect of
hours is captured by the industry dummy, the hours variable captures any variations
beyond this. Higher hours in the current industry make other industries seem more
attractive for a given wage and wage oer. I thank David Margolis for pointing this
out to me.
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The coecients of interest are those on on-the-job training. All co-
ecients on training with the current rm are negative, implying the
increase in tenure observed earlier, though the present specication does
not allow us quantify the relative impacts. Barring selection aspects,
which we will explore later, this implies that training is correlated with
higher rm-attachment. However, it is clear from the estimates that
training has dierent eects on each risk. Thus, the coecient of on-
the-job training is smaller in absolute value for transitions to same-
industry jobs than for transitions to jobs in other industries. Further-
more, whereas training in other industries has no signicant eect on
transitions to same-industry jobs, training received in the same indus-
try has no eect on transitions to jobs in other industries, and train-
ing received in other industries increases these transitions, suggesting
industry-specicity of training. Previously received training never has
any eect on transition intensities out of employment, whether acquired
in the current or another industry. Finally, o-the-job training does not
seem to have any impact on job transitions, but reduces transition in-
tensities to non-employment. This is what we analyze more formally
furtheron, using the conditional probabilities discussed earlier.
Table 11 reports results when heterogeneity is controlled for in the
Cox partial likelihood framework. The tenure-reducing eect of train-
ing is increased by about 40 percent. There no longer seems to be any
dierential eect of training with the current employer according to des-
tination. This pattern seems more in line with rm-specic training.
Remember from Section 5.1, though, that the quantitative eect of of
this eect is negligible. Furthermore, the eect of previously received
training reduces the overall hazard, irrespective of the industry in which
training was received, but this eect seems to come entirely from a reduc-
tion of the transition intensity into non-employment. The interpretation
in our model is that wage oers from any sector have become relatively
more attractive. This belies rm-specicity, and points towards general
or industry-specic training.
Thus, results from an analysis of the eect on transition intensities
do not provide a clear picture. Possibly, and not surprisingly, training
has both general and specic components. A clearer picture appears
when we compute the conditional probabilities laid out earlier. Tables
14 to 21 provide the empirical counterparts to Table 1 in Section 4.
Column (a) in Table 14 computes the approriate probabilities for the
results reported in Table 10, and Column (b) for those in Table 11. In
columns (c) and (d), we control for the fact that the NLSY oversamples
certain demographic groups, and columns (e) and (f) reports results for
when we include controls for whether or not the trainee completed the
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program or not.
The rst row of Table 14 shows the eect of training with the cur-
rent employer on the probability of a sectoral move when changing jobs,
@M
2
(t)=@ONCJT . It is consistently negative, though those specica-
tions which control for individual heterogeneity provide noisier estimates.
The impact of training on previous jobs diers with its source. In most
specications, if training was acquired in the same industry (row 3), sec-
toral mobility is reduced. If it was acquired in a dierent industry (row
2), sectoral mobility is increased. These results suggest that training
has a component which is sector-specic, since the signs of the eect of
all three on-the-job training variables are inconsistent with the mobility
patterns of either rm-specic or general human capital.
As reported in Table 6, only about 10 percent of training is not
completed. Controlling for incomplete training duration does not change
coecients on completed training, as reported here.
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Columns (b), (d), and (f) control for individual heterogeneity, and the
results suggest that a large amount of the mobility patterns associated
with training may be due to this kind of heterogeneity. Note however
that this generally occurs because of increased standard errors, and not
because the sign of the point estimate for the probability of a sectoral
move changes. However, controls for heterogeneity also take out any
eect constant per individual, but heterogeneous in the data, possibly
hiding more general patterns. In Tables 15 to 17, we explore the impact
of control for gender. A comparison of Panel (a) of Table 15 with its
theoretical counterpart, Table 1, remains inconclusive. However, once
individual heterogeneity is controlled for, the pattern is clearer. While
the coecients for training with the current rm would suggest that
training is rm-specic, the eect of previous training in the same in-
dustry seems more consistent with industry-specic training, as are, to
a lesser degree, those on training acquired in other industries. Training
acquired in the same industry reduces the transition intensity to non-
employment, which suggests industry-specic or general training. The
eect of training on the overall hazard conrms this. Turning again to
the probability of sectoral moves in Table 17 reinforces support for the
interpretation of training as industry-specic capital: Both training with
the current rm and with prior employers in the same industry reduce
the probability of a sectoral move. Inconsistent with the expounded
theory, training received in other industries reduces the probability of
quitting the current industry.
40
Not reported here, coecients on incompleted training generally cancel out any
eect of completed training.
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For women, the pattern is less clear. Whereas the eect of dierent
types of training on the transition intensity to non-employment again
suggest rm-specic training even after controlling for heterogeneity, all
types of training uniformly reduce both job transition intensities, which
our theory cannot accommodate. The eect on the overall hazard again
suggests rm-specicity. Again turning to the probability of sectoral
moves, Table 17 shows that training with the current rm reduces the
probability of a sectoral move, consistent with industry-specicity, but
previous training in the industry actually increases the probability of
a sectoral change. However, all these probabilities are not signicantly
dierent from zero, which may suggest either rm-specic training or
general training.
This is possibly linked to dierent occupational patterns of men and
women, which are not controlled for in this paper. As an example, if
women are more likely to be in clerical occupations, and training oc-
curs for these occupations, it may well be that employment options are
increased in other industries as well. This subject remains to be ex-
plored.
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The coecient of training acquired in other industries by men
on the probability of a sectoral move implies that although training was
received in a dierent industry, it reduces the probability of leaving the
current industry. For women, a dierent story emerges: training received
in the current industry actually increases the possibility of leaving the
current industry. If there exist entrance or feeder industries which
are used as starting points for careers which end in other industries,
42
such a pattern could be observed if our data consists primarily of men
who have already left the feeder industry and of women who are still
overwhelmingly in their feeder industries.
43
This leaves substantial
room for future research.
The fact that controls for heterogeneity substantially weaken the re-
ported eect on the probability of sectoral mobility may be due to se-
lection problems referred to in Section 2. If training is dispensed only to
individuals who are less mobile, then measuring hours of training with-
out controls for individual heterogeneity in the baseline hazard could
lead to the observed correlation between training and mobility. Train-
ing proxies for intrinsic mobility observable by the employer. In that
case, the same should be true for an indicator of training receipt. To
explore this further, we replaced hours of training by an indicator for
41
See McCall (1990) for a test of occupational matching, though not mobility.
42
See Jovanovic & Nyarko (1996) for a possible theoretical explanation.
43
See McCall (1990) for some evidence on feeder occupations. In the context of
intra-rm mobility, Baker, Gibbs & Holmstrom (1994) provide evidence of occupa-
tional career ladders within an organization.
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the incidence of training with the current company as regressor. Results
reported in Table 18, columns (a) and (b), do not seem to support this
interpretation. Incidence is robust to the specication of heterogeneity
except when used for training acquired in other industries. Incidence of
training is correlated with a decline in sectoral mobility as long as train-
ing is acquired in the same industry, where it is not important whether
the current employer or previous employers provided it. This would seem
at odds with selection purely based on mobility.
A dierent selection story would say that training is not dispensed
arbitrariy, and that whatever characteristic the employer uses as a selec-
tion criterion may be spuriously correlated with dierences in mobility
patterns. To explore this, we restricted our sample to those observa-
tions for workers who had already received training with some previous
employer, and who have changed employers since. If there were a sys-
tematic dierence between workers receiving training and others, then
it could be expected that any residual mobility eect of training would
be captured without controls for heterogeneity, i.e. the subsample of
observations thus selected provides adequate control for selection-based
heterogeneity. Table 18, columns (c), shows results without controls for
heterogeneity. This selected subset of workers, homogeneous in the re-
spect that they have already been selected at least once for training, still
shows the by now typical pattern of sectoral mobility, corresponding to
the case of industry-specic training, though the eect is weaker than
for the full sample. Thus, the mobility patterns found so far cannot be
solely attributed to a selection bias into training. However, column (d)
highlights the fact that controls for heterogeneity still increase the stan-
dard errors, thus reducing the level of signicance substantially, without
changing the signs of the computed probabilities.
These results suggest that at least in part, the endogeneity of the
separation decision with respect to training might still be biasing our
results. A valid exogenous instrument for separation that has been fre-
quently used in labor economics is that of plant closure. The resultant
displacement of workers is assumed to be the result of factors outside
the worker-rm match.
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Restricting the sample to displaced workers
yields the results reported in column (e) of Table 18. Here, the prob-
ability of sectoral change is decreased by training acquired in the same
industry, and increased by training in other industries, though none are
signicant, possibly to the small sample size.
45
These results for this
44
See Neal (1995) for an application to identify industry-specic informal training
(experience). An extensive analysis of the long-term income eects of displacement
is found in Jacobson, LaLonde & Sullivan (1993).
45
Regressions for displaced workers controlling for heterogeneity did not yield re-
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small sub-sample of workers would again seem to indicate the presence
of industry-specic training.
We next turn to the conditional probability of nding a job, ex-
pressed by M
job
as dened in Section 2. Tables 19 to 21 report results
for the same specications explored previously. The results are fairly
robust across all specications, revealing the benecial eects of train-
ing with respect to the probability of being employed after a job sep-
aration: Training, whether on or o-the-job, increases the probability
of re-employment conditional on separation. Again, this seems incon-
sistent with (pure) rm-specicity. Some dierences from this general
pattern, however, are worth pointing out. As Table 19 shows, though
positive, the employment eect of training with the current rm is not
signicantly dierent from zero when excluding the oversampled pop-
ulation. Though this may again suggest rm-specicity, it disappears
once the eect of incomplete training is taken out (columns (e) and (f)).
Employment attachment is then increased for all types of training, pos-
sibly giving an indication of training serving as a signal. The positive
employment attachment eect of training seems to be equally strong for
training acquired in the same industry as for training with the current
rm, but weaker if training was acquired in another industry. Although
our theory does not provide much guidance in evaluating the relative size
of the impact, this may suggest industry-specicity: The probability of
receiving a job oer from the own sector is stronger.
Turning to gender-specic results in Table 20, we again note some
dierences in the eect of training on employment attachment probabil-
ities between men and women, possibly related to occupational mobility
patterns. Whereas training received with the current employer increases
employment attachment for both sexes, for men it turns out that the
eect of training received with previous employers in the same industry
is stronger than for training received with employers in other industries.
For women, however, any previously acquired training increases labor
force attachment by about the same factor.
Replacing hours of training with its incidence (Table 21, columns
(a) and (b)) leads to the insignicance of training received in the cur-
rent industry, though the signs are still positive when heterogeneity is
controlled for. The strongest eect seems to come from employment
in other industries. Columns (c) and (d) reports results for hours of
sults. Only 217 worker in the sample experienced displacement more than once. The
sample means show that their jobs are in general in areas of higher unemployment,
that completed tenure is lower, and that they are paid lower wages. The sample av-
erage of training is actually higher than for the full sample, but otherwise the sample
means do not seem to dier substantially from the full sample.
30
training when incidence is added as supplementary explanatory variable
instead of replacing hours as in columns (a) and (b).
46
When both in-
cidence and hours of training are included as explanatory variables, the
eect of training with the current employer is still very imprecisely es-
timated. However, hours of training received with previous employers
have an eect above and beyond a pure incidence eect, particularly
when heterogeneity is controlled for. Thus, even if though selection into
training may play a role with the current company, the duration of train-
ing received with previous companies does show a positive impact on the
probability of employment, inconsistent with a pure selection argument.
Finally, the evidence for displaced workers having training in other
industries, column (e), is unclear, but the eect of previous training in
the same industry, though too noisy an estimate, points in the direction
consistent with non-rm-specic training (general or industry-specic).
Note also that the employment eect of o-the-job training, which sig-
nicantly increases the probability of employment after a job separation
in most of the specications considered, does displaced workers no good.
If o-the-job training serves as a preparation for a career move, then dis-
placed workers are possibly surprised by their displacement, and cannot
focus such activities.
47
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The coecients on incidence do not change substantially when duration is
included.
47
Note however that Jacobson et al. (1993) point out that earnings for displaced
workers decrease several quarters before displacement, indicating that workers should
have ample notice of displacement.
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6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have used the detailed data on formal on-the-job train-
ing available in the NLSY to re-evaluate the mobility eects of such
training. We report estimates on the quantitative impact of training as
well as on the intra- and inter-sectoral mobility patterns associated with
training.
We nd that although training does increase expected tenure with
the training rm, the increase does not seem to exceed the length of
the training spell itself, whether evaluated at the mean or the median
duration of job spells: Net working time is unaected by training. This
would be consistent with human capital theory if the capital formed
through training were applicable to a number of rms, either through-
out the economy (general human capital) or within the same industry
(industry-specic human capital). It conrms results obtained on the
remuneration of training by the training rm and subsequent employers,
which showed that training was remunerated by the latter at the same
rate as by the training rm itself, suggesting transferability of human
capital acquired through training.
To determine the degree of specicity, we analyze the mobility pat-
terns of workers after job separation, concentrating on the sectoral mo-
bility, with non-employment modeled as a third sector. Conditional on
leaving the current rm, a multinomial probit nds no eect of training
on the sectoral allocation of workers. However, we test and reject the
sequential multinomial model in favor of a competing risks specication.
The results from a proportional hazard specication of the compet-
ing risks model provide substantial evidence for industry-specicity of
training, though the mobility patterns also reveal some rm-attachment
related with training. The eect of training with the current rm seems
to uniformly reduce transition intensities to all destinations, though as
the result on duration implies, the increase may not be substantially
more than the time spent on training programs.
Consistent with a model of sector-specic human capital, training
acquired in the current industry, whether with the current employer or
with previous employers, is associated with a reduction in the probability
of a sectoral move. Strongest evidence for industry-specicity comes
from men, for whom the probability of a sectoral change is substantially
reduced by training within the same industry. The industry-specicity is
especially present when incidence of training is used instead of total hours
of training, suggesting that the interplay of training and mobility may be
more complex than what can be captured by hours of training. However,
the pattern provided by training acquired in other industries does not
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conform well with a matching-augmented model of human capital.
The evidence for sector-specicity from the probability of employ-
ment attachment is less strong. Though training with previous employ-
ers generally increases employment attachment, the eect of training
with the current rm seems less clear.
Overall, the evidence points to a strong sector-specic character of
training when mobility patterns are taken into account. This helps to
partially explain why previous studies have found that rms remuner-
ate training received with prior employers, though subsequent analysis
should take into account the industry in which prior training was ac-
quired. However, it increases the mystery of why rms would pay for
training which is of use to other employers, as the same wage regressions
seems to show. More research in this area is thus called for.
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Figure 1: Transition intensities
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Figure 2: Transition intensities and transition windows
38
Table 4: Training codes in NLSY
Code On-the-job Description
1 Business school
3 yes Apprenticeship program
4 Vocational or technical institute
7 Correspondence course
8 yes Formal company training run by employer or military training
9 yes Seminars or training programs at work not run by employer
10 Seminars or training programs outside of work
11 Vocational rehabilitation center
12 Other
Table 5:
Industry aggregation
Industry SIC codes Name
01 017-028 Agriculture,forestry and sheries
02 047-057 Mining
03 067-077 Construction
04 107-398 Manufacturing
05 407-479 Transportation,communication, public utilities
06 507-698 Wholesale and retail trade
07 707-718 Finance,insurance and real estate
08 727-759 Business and repair services
09 769-798 Personal services
10 807-809 Entertainment and recreation services
11 828-897 Professional and related services
12 907-937 Public administration
39
Table 6: Sample means
Full sample Positive training
Tenure w/ Employer (weeks) 82.36 224.96
Actual exp since 1978 185.40 241.28
Hrs per Wk at Job 37.07 40.33
Hourly Wage (Cvtd) Job 6.94 22.88
Wage set by Union Job 0.13 0.18
Highest Grade completed (years) 12.12 12.27
Number Unique jobs held 5.70 6.85
Married 0.35 0.37
Female 0.44 0.45
Next job: Other industry 0.278 0.182
Next job: Same industry 0.196 0.175
Job ends in non-employment 0.420 0.250
On the job training current (hours) 16.98 315.02
ONJT current (incomplete, hours) 1.59 29.51
ONJT current (weeks) 0.81 15.10
Prior ONJT 50.35 95.38
of which in same industry 14.76 35.73
Prior ONJT (incomplete, hours) 7.69 16.15
Prior ONJT (weeks) 2.33 5.10
O-the-job training (hours) 1261.75 2997.35
O-the-job training (weeks) 73.48 168.26
Observations 40 059 2 553
Transition window size is ve weeks for means on transition data.
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Table 7: Base specication
Duration analysis
Gamma Normal Weibull Cox
On-the-job training 0.0194 0.0205 0.0161 0.0772
(0.0026) ( 0.0027) (0.0027) (0.0059)
Prior ONJT -0.0132 -0.0141 -0.0120 -0.0082
(0.0013) ( 0.0014) (0.0011) (0.0021)
O-the-job training 0.0013 0.0013 0.0011 0.0014
(0.0001) ( 0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002)
Log-likelihood -58900.63 -59369.78 -60185.80
Parameter estimates from parametric duration models and Cox partial likelihood model.
40 059 obs. Dependent variable for the parametric models is log tenure. Coecients for
the Cox model are the negative of the eect on the baseline hazard. Training variables
in 100s of hours of training. All regressions include indicators for sex, union status,
race and marital status, years of completed schooling, weeks of labor market experience,
hourly wage rates, weekly hours, local unemployment rate, plus region, year and industry
dummies. All variables are taken at the start of the job. All coecients signicant at 1
percent level.
Table 8:
Impact of training programs
Duration analysis
Training program of 320 hours = 9.14 weeks
Duration Gamma Log-normal
in weeks:
Standard worker 6.82 6.16
[ 4.95 , 8.73] [ 4.71 , 7.62]
Median worker 7.85 14.25
[ 4.50 , 11.45 ] [ 8.92 , 20.13 ]
Increase in expected tenure due to on-the-job training received with the cur-
rent rm. See Table 7 and text for raw coecients and other details. 95
percent condence intervals in square brackets.
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Conditional sectoral allocation
Other industry job Same industry job
Standard Standard
Estimate
Error
Estimate
Error
(a) Linear time
Intercept -0.7618 0.0783 -1.4171 0.0898
On-the-job training
w/ last employer 0.0056
(=)
0.0091 0.0098
(=)
0.0093
other industry 0.0174 0.0057 -0.0030
(=)
0.0070
same industry -0.0100
(=)
0.0107 0.0303 0.0091
O-the-job training 0.0014 0.0005 0.0022 0.0005
Tenure 0.0868 0.0169 0.2040 0.0179
Initial exp. 0.0027 0.0001 0.0034 0.0001
Hours/Week 0.0027 0.0010 0.0073 0.0012
Wage -0.0002
(=)
0.0010 0.0018
(+)
0.0008
Jobs ever held -0.0630 0.0039 -0.0705 0.0044
Union 0.1369 0.0194 0.1011 0.0220
Schooling -0.0062
(=)
0.0055 -0.0116
( )
0.0063
Female 0.1465 0.0132 0.0509 0.0150
Race -0.0522 0.0179 -0.0446
(+)
0.0205
Married 0.0083
(=)
0.0137 -0.0020
(=)
0.0156
(b) Polynomial time
Tenure 0.6840 0.0732 1.1676 0.0809
Tenure
2
-0.3041 0.0415 -0.4741 0.0447
Tenure
3
0.0337 0.0057 0.0511 0.0060
Initial exp. 0.9774 0.0568 0.8957 0.0645
Experience
2
-0.2291 0.0241 -0.1828 0.0267
Experience
3
0.0180 0.0029 0.0145 0.0031
Parameter estimates from multinomial logit model. 33 586 observations. Omitted category
is non-employment. Training variables in 100s of hours of training, tenure and experience in
100s of weeks. Transition window length is 5 weeks. Estimates from the regression in Panel
(b) are available on demand. All coecients signicant at 1 percent level except (+) not
signicant at 1 percent level, (-) not signicant at 5 percent level, (=) not signicant at 10
percent level.
Table 9: Multinomial logit estimates
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Table 10:
Proportionality factor
Cox partial likelihood
Base specication
Transition intensities
Other industry Non-employment
Hazard Same industry Job
On-the-job training:
Current job -0.077 -0.074 -0.054 -0.094 -0.066
(0.006) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.007)
Prior, other industry 0.008 0.014 0.001
(=)
0.003
(=)
0.009
(0.002) (0.003) (0.005) (0.004) (0.002)
Prior, same industry 0.003
(=)
-0.013
( )
0.017 -0.004
(=)
0.005
(=)
(0.003) (0.007) (0.005) (0.007) (0.004)
O-the-job training -0.014 -0.008
(+)
-0.002
(=)
-0.025 -0.005
(+)
(0.002) (0.004) (0.041) (0.003) (0.004)
Parameter estimates from Cox partial likelihood models. Standard errors in parentheses. 40 059 obs. On-the-job
training in 100s of hours, o-the-job training in 1000s of hours. For other details, see footnote to Table 7. For
full results, see Table 13. All coecients signicant at 1 percent level except (+) not signicant at 1 percent
level, (-) not signicant at 5 percent level, (=) not signicant at 10 percent level as determined by a 
2
(1) test.
Table 11:
Proportionality factor
Cox partial likelihood
Heterogeneity
Transition intensities
Other industry Non-employment
Hazard Same industry Job
On-the-job training:
Current job -0.111 -0.116 -0.112 -0.125 -0.114
(0.011) (0.019) (0.021) (0.017) (0.014)
Prior, other industry -0.022 -0.007
(=)
-0.004
(=)
-0.071 -0.005
(=)
(0.007) (0.011) (0.014) (0.014) (0.009)
Prior, same industry -0.021 -0.012
(=)
0.004
(=)
-0.067 -0.004
(=)
(0.008) (0.013) (0.015) (0.017) (0.010)
O-the-job training -0.050
(+)
-0.046 -0.036
(+)
-0.065 -0.043
(0.007) (0.013) (0.017) (0.010) (0.010)
Parameter estimates from Cox partial likelihood models. Standard errors in parentheses. 40 059 obs. On-the-job
training in 100s of hours, o-the-job training in 1000s of hours. For other details, see footnote to Table 7. For
full results, see Table 13. All coecients signicant at 1 percent level except (+) not signicant at 1 percent
level, (-) not signicant at 5 percent level, (=) not signicant at 10 percent level, as determined by a 
2
(1) test.
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Table 12:
Base specication
Eect on baseline hazard
Cox partial likelihood
Parameter Standard
Variable Estimate Error
On-the-job training:
current job -0.0772 0.00590
previous, other industry 0.0080240 0.00210
previous, same industry 0.0032177 0.00344
O-the-job training -0.014197 0.00204
Years of education 0.000040732 0.00244
Initial experience -0.000824 0.0000652
Jobs ever held 0.001008 0.00181
Hours per week -0.000218 0.0004719
Hourly wage $ -0.003364 0.0008368
Dummies:
Union -0.171259 0.01668
Married 0.003914 0.01200
Female -0.009124 0.01208
Race 0.043135 0.01546
Parameter estimates from Cox partial likelihood models. 40 059 obs.
On-the-job training in 100s of hours, o-the-job training in 1000s of
hours. All regressions include controls for local unemployment rate,
region of residence, industry of origin, and calendar year of job change.
All variables (except year) measured at start of job.
44
Ta
b
l
e
1
3
:
C
o
m
p
e
t
i
n
g
h
a
z
a
r
d
s
p
e
c
i

c
a
t
i
o
n
P
r
o
p
o
r
t
i
o
n
a
l
i
t
y
f
a
c
t
o
r
C
o
x
p
a
r
t
i
a
l
l
i
k
e
l
i
h
o
o
d
E
x
i
t
t
o
O
t
h
e
r
i
n
d
u
s
t
r
y
S
a
m
e
i
n
d
u
s
t
r
y
N
o
n
-
e
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
P
a
r
a
m
e
t
e
r
S
t
a
n
d
a
r
d
P
a
r
a
m
e
t
e
r
S
t
a
n
d
a
r
d
P
a
r
a
m
e
t
e
r
S
t
a
n
d
a
r
d
V
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
E
s
t
i
m
a
t
e
E
r
r
o
r
E
s
t
i
m
a
t
e
E
r
r
o
r
E
s
t
i
m
a
t
e
E
r
r
o
r
O
n
-
t
h
e
-
j
o
b
t
r
a
i
n
i
n
g
:
c
u
r
r
e
n
t
j
o
b
-
0
.
0
7
4
3
0
.
0
1
0
0
6
-
0
.
0
5
3
6
0
.
0
0
9
7
9
-
0
.
0
9
4
2
0
.
0
1
0
2
1
p
r
e
v
i
o
u
s
,
o
t
h
e
r
i
n
d
u
s
t
r
y
0
.
0
1
4
0
0
.
0
0
2
8
5
0
.
0
0
0
5
0
.
0
0
4
6
5
0
.
0
0
2
8
0
.
0
0
4
0
6
p
r
e
v
i
o
u
s
,
s
a
m
e
i
n
d
u
s
t
r
y
-
0
.
0
1
3
0
0
.
0
0
7
3
7
0
.
0
1
6
5
0
.
0
0
4
5
9
-
0
.
0
0
3
5
0
.
0
0
6
8
3
O

-
t
h
e
-
j
o
b
t
r
a
i
n
i
n
g
-
0
.
0
0
8
0
6
0
0
.
0
0
3
5
6
-
0
.
0
0
1
4
9
9
0
.
0
0
4
0
5
-
0
.
0
2
4
6
2
3
0
.
0
0
3
1
5
Y
e
a
r
s
o
f
e
d
u
c
a
t
i
o
n
-
0
.
0
0
0
9
2
3
0
.
0
0
4
3
1
-
0
.
0
0
9
1
2
3
0
.
0
0
5
3
0
0
.
0
0
5
3
6
0
0
.
0
0
3
5
8
I
n
i
t
i
a
l
e
x
p
e
r
i
e
n
c
e
0
.
0
0
0
3
9
4
0
.
0
0
0
1
2
0
.
0
0
0
6
8
7
0
.
0
0
0
1
3
-
0
.
0
0
2
4
0
7
0
.
0
0
0
1
0
J
o
b
s
e
v
e
r
h
e
l
d
-
0
.
0
2
2
9
1
3
0
.
0
0
3
2
8
-
0
.
0
3
0
6
5
7
0
.
0
0
3
9
7
0
.
0
3
5
4
4
9
0
.
0
0
2
6
0
H
o
u
r
s
p
e
r
w
e
e
k
-
0
.
0
0
0
4
2
5
0
.
0
0
0
8
4
0
.
0
0
6
5
3
4
0
.
0
0
1
0
6
-
0
.
0
0
2
7
1
4
0
.
0
0
0
6
8
H
o
u
r
l
y
w
a
g
e
$
-
0
.
0
1
8
3
0
.
0
0
3
0
0
-
0
.
0
0
0
0
3
1
0
.
0
0
0
1
1
-
0
.
0
2
0
4
0
.
0
0
3
0
3
D
u
m
m
i
e
s
:
U
n
i
o
n
-
0
.
2
7
0
9
9
3
0
.
0
3
1
2
8
-
0
.
2
3
8
5
5
1
0
.
0
3
7
1
5
-
0
.
0
5
8
9
3
4
0
.
0
2
3
4
4
M
a
r
r
i
e
d
0
.
0
0
2
8
6
6
0
.
0
2
1
3
2
-
0
.
0
0
1
9
2
4
0
.
0
2
5
9
3
0
.
0
0
7
0
8
8
0
.
0
1
7
5
2
F
e
m
a
l
e
-
0
.
1
9
2
7
9
6
0
.
0
2
1
7
2
0
.
0
0
7
6
2
4
0
.
0
2
6
9
0
0
.
0
9
2
5
0
6
0
.
0
1
7
4
2
R
a
c
e
0
.
0
8
3
6
8
7
0
.
0
2
7
9
3
0
.
0
5
6
8
1
1
0
.
0
3
4
0
8
0
.
0
0
8
2
0
1
0
.
0
2
2
1
6
P
a
r
a
m
e
t
e
r
e
s
t
i
m
a
t
e
s
f
r
o
m
C
o
x
p
a
r
t
i
a
l
l
i
k
e
l
i
h
o
o
d
m
o
d
e
l
s
.
4
0
0
5
9
o
b
s
.
O
n
-
t
h
e
-
j
o
b
t
r
a
i
n
i
n
g
i
n
1
0
0
s
o
f
h
o
u
r
s
,
o

-
t
h
e
-
j
o
b
t
r
a
i
n
i
n
g
i
n
1
0
0
0
s
o
f
h
o
u
r
s
.
A
l
l
r
e
g
r
e
s
s
i
o
n
s
i
n
c
l
u
d
e
c
o
n
t
r
o
l
s
f
o
r
l
o
c
a
l
u
n
e
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
r
a
t
e
,
r
e
g
i
o
n
o
f
r
e
s
i
d
e
n
c
e
,
i
n
d
u
s
t
r
y
o
f
o
r
i
g
i
n
,
a
n
d
c
a
l
e
n
d
a
r
y
e
a
r
o
f
j
o
b
s
t
a
r
t
.
A
l
l
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s
m
e
a
s
u
r
e
d
a
t
s
t
a
r
t
o
f
j
o
b
.
45
Ta
b
l
e
1
4
:
P
r
o
b
a
b
i
l
i
t
y
o
f
s
e
c
t
o
r
a
l
m
o
v
e
C
o
x
p
a
r
t
i
a
l
l
i
k
e
l
i
h
o
o
d
D
e
r
i
v
a
t
i
v
e
o
f
M
2
(
t
)
w
i
t
h
r
e
s
p
e
c
t
t
o
:
(
a
)
(
b
)
(
c
)
(
d
)
(
e
)
(
f
)
O
n
-
t
h
e
-
j
o
b
t
r
a
i
n
i
n
g
:
C
u
r
r
e
n
t
j
o
b
-
0
.
0
2
0
7
-
4
.
6
0
E
-
0
3
-
0
.
0
5
4
-
0
.
0
2
2
-
0
.
0
3
3
-
0
.
0
2
2
(
2
.
1
7
5
)
(
0
.
0
2
6
)
(
9
.
6
5
8
)
(
0
.
4
1
8
)
(
4
.
5
2
5
)
(
0
.
4
7
6
)
P
r
i
o
r
,
o
t
h
e
r
i
n
d
u
s
t
r
y
0
.
0
1
3
5
-
2
.
4
4
E
-
0
3
0
.
0
1
4
0
.
0
1
3
0
.
0
1
4
-
0
.
0
0
3
(
6
.
1
5
5
)
(
0
.
0
1
8
)
(
4
.
4
2
3
)
(
0
.
4
1
7
)
(
6
.
1
5
2
)
(
0
.
0
2
9
)
P
r
i
o
r
,
s
a
m
e
i
n
d
u
s
t
r
y
-
0
.
0
2
9
5
-
0
.
0
1
6
-
0
.
0
2
1
0
.
0
0
5
-
0
.
0
2
9
-
0
.
0
1
7
(
1
1
.
5
4
4
)
(
0
.
6
8
1
)
(
3
.
8
3
8
)
(
0
.
0
4
4
)
(
1
1
.
4
8
8
)
(
0
.
7
2
8
)
O

-
t
h
e
-
j
o
b
t
r
a
i
n
i
n
g
-
0
.
6
6
E
-
0
5
0
.
9
9
E
-
0
5
-
0
.
8
1
E
-
0
2
-
0
.
0
3
4
-
0
.
6
6
E
-
0
2
-
0
.
9
5
E
-
0
2
(
1
.
4
7
8
)
(
0
.
2
1
8
)
(
1
.
4
0
4
)
(
1
.
6
1
8
)
(
1
.
4
8
8
)
(
0
.
2
0
2
)
O
v
e
r
s
a
m
p
l
e
e
x
c
l
u
d
e
d
:
N
o
N
o
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
N
o
N
o
I
n
c
o
m
p
l
e
t
e
t
r
a
i
n
i
n
g
:
N
o
N
o
N
o
N
o
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
H
e
t
e
r
o
g
e
n
e
i
t
y
:
N
o
Y
e
s
N
o
Y
e
s
N
o
Y
e
s
P
a
r
a
m
e
t
e
r
e
s
t
i
m
a
t
e
s
f
r
o
m
C
o
x
p
a
r
t
i
a
l
l
i
k
e
l
i
h
o
o
d
m
o
d
e
l
s
.
4
0
0
5
9
o
b
s
.

2
(
1
)
v
a
l
u
e
s
i
n
p
a
r
e
n
t
h
e
s
e
s
.

2 0
:
9
0
(
1
)
=
2
:
7
0
6
,

2 0
:
9
9
(
1
)
=
6
:
6
3
5
.
F
o
r
o
t
h
e
r
d
e
t
a
i
l
s
,
s
e
e
f
o
o
t
n
o
t
e
t
o
T
a
b
l
e
7
.
46
Table 15:
Training coecients
Cox partial likelihood
Men
Derivative of  
2

1

3
with respect to:
(a) No heterogeneity
On-the-job training:
Current job -0.060 -0.057 -0.045 -0.073
(0.006) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011)
Prior, other industry 0.008 0.011 0.001
(=)
0.006
(=)
(0.002) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005)
Prior, same industry 0.003
(=)
-0.010
(=)
0.016 -0.005
(=)
(0.004) (0.008) (0.005) (0.008)
O-the-job training -0.013 -0.001
(=)
-0.001
(=)
-0.030
(0.003) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005)
(b) Heterogeneity
On-the-job training:
Current job -0.089 -0.204 -0.099 -0.203
(0.011) (0.025) (0.021) (0.045)
Prior, other industry -0.018
( )
-0.056 -0.007
(=)
-0.024
(=)
(0.008) (0.017) (0.012) (0.029)
Prior, same industry -0.017
( )
-0.056
(+)
-0.010
(=)
-0.124
(+)
(0.009) (0.024) (0.014) (0.057)
O-the-job training -0.038 -0.062 -0.036 -0.061
(0.010) (0.011) (0.017) (0.021)
Parameter estimates from Cox partial likelihood models. 22 420 obs. For other details, see
footnote to Table 7. All coecients signicant at 1 percent level except (+) not signicant at
1 percent level, (-) not signicant at 5 percent level, (=) not signicant at 10 percent level as
determined by a 
2
(1) testl.
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Table 16:
Training coecients
Cox partial likelihood
Women
Derivative of  
2

1

3
with respect to:
(a) No heterogeneity
On-the-job training:
Current job -0.132 -0.180 -0.079 -0.141
(0.013) (0.031) (0.021) (0.020)
Prior, other industry 0.005
(=)
0.019
( )
17.4e-5
(=)
-0.002
(=)
(0.005) (0.008) (0.011) (0.008)
Prior, same industry 0.003
(=)
-0.063
( )
0.016
(=)
0.009
(=)
(0.008) (0.028) (0.009) (0.012)
O-the-job training -0.015 -0.015 -0.006
(=)
-0.020
(0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004)
(b) Heterogeneity
On-the-job training:
Current job -0.145 -0.095 -0.255 -0.102
(0.042) (0.018) (0.042) (0.015)
Prior, other industry -0.049
(=)
-0.058 -0.100 -0.006
(=)
(0.037) (0.016) (0.027) (0.009)
Prior, same industry 0.016
(=)
-0.055 -0.088
( )
-0.005
(=)
(0.040) (0.018) (0.038) (0.010)
O-the-job training -0.043
(=)
-0.059 -0.069 -0.032
( )
(0.027) (0.015) (0.014) (0.013)
Parameter estimates from Cox partial likelihood models. 22 420 obs. For other details, see
footnote to Table 7. All coecients signicant at 1 percent level except (+) not signicant at
1 percent level, (-) not signicant at 5 percent level, (=) not signicant at 10 percent level as
determined by a 
2
(1) testl.
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Table 17:
Probability of sectoral move
Cox partial likelihood
by gender
Men Women
Derivative of M
2
(t)
with respect to: (a) (b) (c) (d)
On-the-job training:
Current job -0.012 -0.105 -0.101 -0.050
(0.607) (10.631) (6.910) (1.145)
Prior, other industry 0.011 -0.050 0.019 0.010
(3.052) ( 5.574) (1.720) (0.055)
Prior, same industry -0.026 -0.046 -0.079 0.072
(7.641) ( 2.711) (6.827) (2.575)
O-the-job training 0.03E-02 -0.026 -0.84E-02 0.010
(0.001) (1.645) (1.232) (0.232)
Heterogeneity: No Yes No Yes
Parameter estimates from Cox partial likelihood models. 40 059 obs. 
2
(1) values in parentheses.

2
0:90
(1) = 2:706, 
2
0:99
(1) = 6:635. For other details, see footnote to Table 7.
Table 18:
Probability of sectoral move
Cox partial likelihood
Displ.
Incidence Conditional workers
Derivative of M
2
(t)
with respect to: (a) (b) (c) (d) (e)
On-the-job training:
Current job -0.152 -0.265 -0.108 -0.003 0.048
( 3.418) (3.912) (10.162) (0.002) (0.878)
Prior, other industry 0.143 -0.105 0.017 0.027 0.070
( 5.812) (0.709) ( 3.781) (0.346) (1.004)
Prior, same industry -0.594 -0.379 -0.030 -0.119 -0.102
(37.758) (5.063) ( 7.480) (0.071) (2.305)
O-the-job training 0.059 0.061 -0.013 0.001 -0.021
(2.333) (0.339) ( 0.748) (0.000) (0.393)
Heterogeneity: No Yes No Yes No
Observations: 40 059 4 179 1 438
Parameter estimates from Cox partial likelihood models. 40 059 obs. 
2
(1) values in parentheses.

2
0:90
(1) = 2:706, 
2
0:99
(1) = 6:635. For other details, see footnote to Table 7.
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Table 20:
Probability of employment attachment
Cox partial likelihood
by gender
Men Women
Derivative of M
job
(t)
with respect to: (a) (b) (c) (d)
On-the-job training:
Current job 0.020 0.098 0.017 0.153
(2.274) (3.590) (0.366) (11.667)
Prior, other industry 0.002 0.021 0.013 0.095
(0.097) (0.411) (1.615) (10.657)
Prior, same industry 0.009 0.123 -0.011 0.083
(0.944) (4.247) (0.448) ( 4.330)
O-the-job training 0.029 0.0298 0.010 -0.022
(20.843) (1.007) (3.385) ( 1.120)
Heterogeneity: No Yes No Yes
Parameter estimates from Cox partial likelihood models. 40 059 obs. 
2
(1) values in parentheses.

2
0:90
(1) = 2:706, 
2
0:99
(1) = 6:635. For other details, see footnote to Table 7.
Table 21:
Probability of employment attachment
Cox partial likelihood
Hours and Displ.
Incidence Incidence workers
Derivative of M
2
(t)
with respect to: (a) (b) (c) (d) (e)
On-the-job training:
Current job -0.054 0.004 0.006 -0.005 -0.015
(0.755) (0.002) (0.621) (0.089) (0.284)
Prior, other industry 0.305 0.281 -0.006 0.030 -0.046
(42.488) (8.877) (1.579) (3.628) (1.415)
Prior, same industry -0.002 0.158 0.012 0.036 0.069
(4.76E-4) (1.545) (1.579) (3.600) (2.032)
O-the-job training 0.122 0.214 0.013 0.010 0.022
(19.800) (8.269) (7.067) (0.410) (0.872)
Heterogeneity: No Yes No Yes No
Observations: 40 059 40 059 1 438
Parameter estimates from Cox partial likelihood models. Columns (a) and (b) report coecients on
incidence variables, all others on 100s of hours of on-the-job training and 1000s of hours of o-the-job
training. 
2
(1) values in parentheses. 
2
0:90
(1) = 2:706, 
2
0:99
(1) = 6:635. For other details, see footnote
to Table 7.
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